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I. INTRODUCTION

Title IX of the Education Amendments Act of 1972' ("Title IX")
prohibits gender based discrimination in education programs2 receiving

* In loving memory of my grandfather, Morrie, who, among his many lessons, taught me the
value of hard work and the virtue of perseverance.
1. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (1999).
2. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(c) (1999) defines "educational institution" as:
For purposes of this chapter an educational institution means any public or
private preschool, elementary, or secondary school, or any institution of
vocational, professional, or higher education, except that in the case of an
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federal financial assistance Title IX is composed oftwo central provisions:
a general prohibition4 and an enforcement power.5 However, enforcement
of these provisions, cannot result in "preferential or disparate treatment."6

educational institution composed of more than one school, college, or department
which are administratively separate units, such term means each such school,
college, or department.

3. The United States Supreme Court has determined that the educational institution must
be either a direct or indirect recipient of federal funds in order for Title IX to regulate the actions
of the institution. See Grove City Coll. v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 571 (1984). Under the Bell Court's
interpretation, which was "program specific," the entire institution was not tainted by such an
action. See id. at 573-74; North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 514-15 (1982); Pub.
L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (1988). In the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Congress
restored the "broad scope of coverage" of Title IX to encompass the entire institution if it receives
any federal funds. See Bell, 465 U.S. at 573-74. However, federal regulatory power, including
Title IX, does not extend to private organizations that do not receive Federal financial assistance
but receive dues from institutions that do. See National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Smith, 119
S. Ct. 924, 926 (1999).
4. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1999) provides, "No person in the United States shall, on the basis
of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance .....
5. 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1999) provides, in relevant part:
Each Federal department and agency which is empowered to extend Federal
financial assistance to any education program or activity, by way of grant, loan,
or contract... is authorized and directed to effectuate the provisions of section
1681 of this title with respect to such program or activity by issuing rules,
regulations, or orders of general applicability which shall be consistent with
achievement of the objectives of the statute authorizing the financial assistance
in connection with which the action is taken.
Id.
6. 20 US.C. § 1681(b) (1999) provides:
Nothing contained in subsection (a) of this section shall be interpreted to require
any educational institution to grant preferential or disparate treatment to the
members of one sex on account of an imbalance which may exist with respect to
the total number or percentage of persons of that sex participating in or receiving
the benefits of any federally supported program or activity, in comparison with
the total number of percentage of persons of that sex in any community, State,
section, or other area: Provided, That this subsection shall not be construed to
prevent the consideration in any hearing or proceeding under this chapter of
statisticalevidence tending to show that such an imbalance exists with respect
to the participation in, or receipt of the benefits of, any such program or activity
by the members of one sex.
Id. (emphasis added).

T17LEIXREGULATIONS

Athletic programs, an integral part of an institution's education program,
are subject to these provisions."
Congress enacted Title IX to combat pervasive discrimination against
women in the educational setting. Since the 1970s, the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW), succeeded by the Department of
Education's (DED)9 Office of Civil Rights (OCR), promulgated regulations
interpreting the provisions ofTitle IX. Two such regulations speak directly
to Title IX's application to athletics.'0

7. See Jayits Amendment, Pub. L. No. 93-380, § 844, 88 Stat. 612 (1974) (directing the
Secretary of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) to issue regulations "which
shall include with respect to intercollegiate athletic activities reasonable provisions considering
the nature of particular sports.") (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1681 note); OFFICE FOR CIVIL RTS., U.S.
DEP'T OF EDUC., EQUAL OPPORTUNITY ININTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS: REQUIREMENTS UNDER
TrLE IX OF THE EDUCATION AMENDMENTs OF 1972 1 (1991).
8. See 118 CONG. REC. 5804 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Bayh); Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101
F.3d 155, 165 (1st Cir. 1996) [hereinafter Cohen IVJ, cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1186 (1997); Bell,
456 U.S. at 523 n.13.
9. The initial agency responsible for the administration of Title IX was HEW. When HEW
split into two agencies, the Department of Education (DED) and the Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS), the DED became the Title IX regulatory agency. See Cohen IV, 101 F.3d
at 165 n.5. For the remainder of this note, the two agencies will be referred to conjunctively as
DED.
10. See 34 C.F.R. § 106.37 (2000) (financial assistance) & 34 C.F.R. § 106.41 (2000)
(athletics). 34 C.F.R. § 106.41 (2000) provides:
(a) General. No person shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation
in, be denied the benefits of, be treated differently from another person or
otherwise be discriminated against in any interscholastic, intercollegiate, club or
intramural athletics offered by a recipient, and no recipient shall provide any
such athletics separately on such basis.
(b) Separate teams. Notwithstanding the requirements of paragraph (a) of this
section, a recipient may operate or sponsor separate teams for members of each
sex where selection for such teams is based upon competitive skill or the activity
involved is a contact sport. However, where a recipient operates or sponsors a
team in a particular sport for members of one sex but operates or sponsors no
such team for members of the other sex, and athletic opportunities for members
of that sex have previously been limited, members of the excluded sex must be
allowed to try-out for the team offered unless the sport involved is a contact
sport. For purposes of this part, contact sports include boxing, wrestling, rugby,
ice hockey, football, basketball and other sports the purpose or major activity of
which involves bodily contact.
(c) Equal Opportunity. A recipient which operates or sponsors interscholastic,
intercollegiate, club or intramural athletics shall provide equal athletic
opportunity for members of both sexes. In determining whether equal
opportunities are available the Director will consider, among other factors:
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In 1979, several years after the promulgation of a number of Title IX
regulations, and after extensive public comment, the DED published a
Policy Interpretation" explaining the regulations. By publishing the Policy
Interpretation, the DED intended to provide an easily administered rule of
compliance with the equal opportunity requirements of Title IX and the
DED's interpretive regulations. 2 One portion of the Policy Interpretation
sets forth a three-prong test under which an institution's compliance with
Title IX and the DED's regulations can be determined. 3 In 1996, the DED

(1) Whether the selection of sports and levels of competition effectively
accommodate the interests and abilities of members of both sexes;
(2) The provision of equipment and supplies;
(3) Scheduling of games and practice time;
(4) Travel and per diem allowances;
(5) Opportunity to receive coaching and academic tutoring;
(6) Assignment and compensation of coaches and tutors;
(7) Provision of locker rooms, practice and competitive facilities;
(8) Provision of medical and training facilities and services;
(9) Provision of housing and dining facilities and services;
(10) Publicity.
Unequal aggregate expenditures for members of each sex or unequal
expenditures for male and female teams if a recipient operates or sponsors
separate teams will not constitute noncompliance with this section, but the
Assistant Secretary may consider the failure to provide necessary funds for teams
for one sex in assessing equality of opportunity for members of each sex....
11. See Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, Policy Interpretation, 44 Fed. Reg.
71,413 (1979) [hereinafter Policy Interpretation].
12. See id.
("[T]his Policy Interpretation explains [34 C.F.R. § 106 et seq.] so as to provide
a framework within which the complaints can be resolved, and to provide institutions of higher
education with additional guidance on the requirements for compliance with Title IX in
intercollegiate athletic programs.").
13. The three-prong test provides:
[1] Whether intercollegiate level participation opportunities for male and female
students are provided in numbers substantially proportionate to their respective
enrollments; or
[2] Where the members of one sex have been and are underrepresented among
intercollegiate athletes, whether the institution can show ahistory and continuing
practice of program expansion which is demonstrably responsive to the
developing interest and abilities of the members of that sex; or
[3] Where the members of one sex are underrepresented among intercollegiate
athletes, and the institution cannot show a continuing practice of program
expansion ....
whether it can be demonstrated that the interests and abilities of
the members of that sex have been fully and effectively accommodated by the

TITLE IXREGULTIONS

published a clarification of the Policy Interpretation intending to demystify
the three-prong test.'4
In addition to the DED regulations, the Policy Interpretation, especially
the three-prong test, has been extensively utilized by courts in deciding
Title IX disputes. 5 However, the appropriateness of the DED's
interpretations has remained relatively unchallenged. This Note
recommends analyzing the propriety of DED's various regulatory and
policy implementations of Title IX and determining whether DED's actions
exceed its statutory mandate. The DED's three-prong test, although
providing an easily applicable procedure, deviates from the principles
espoused in Title IX and its properly promulgated regulations.
Furthermore, alternative interpretations or enactments could provide an
application that is more consistent with the intent of Title IX and with
judicial precedent.
II.

THE POLICY INTERPRETATION: THREE PRONGS OF COMPLIANCE

A. Overview
On May 27, 1975, President Ford signed the regulation implementing
Title IX into law and submitted it to Congress for review.16 After a three
year transition period and in response to a number of complaints 7 of
present program.

Id. at 71,418.
14. See Cover Letter from Norma V. Cantu, Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights
accompanying, OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC. CLARIFICATION OF
INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETIC POLICY GUIDANCE: THE THREE-PART TEST (Jan. 16, 1996) (available
at <http://www.ed.gov/offices/OCR/clarific.html> (visited Dec. 18, 2000)) [hereinafter Cover
Letter to Clarification].
15. See, e.g., Pederson v. Louisiana State Univ., 201 F.3d 388,409-10 (5th Cir. 2000); Neal
v. Board of Tr., 198 F.3d 763, 767 (9th Cir. 1999); Cohen v. Brown Univ. (Cohen IV), 101 F.3d
155, 172-73 (ist Cir. 1996); Homer v. Kentucky High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 43 F.3d 265, 273 (6th
Cir. 1994), reh 'g denied, Kelley v. Board of Tr., 35 F.3d 265,268-72 (7th Cir. 1994), cert. denied,
513 U.S. 1128 (1995); Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 894-900(lstCir. 1993), remanded
879 F. Supp. 185 (D.R.I. 1995), aff'd inpart,rev'd in part, 101 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1996), cert.
denied, 520 U.S. 1186 (1997) [hereinafter Cohen fl]; Favia v. Indiana Univ. of Pa., 7 F.3d 332,
343-344 (3d Cir. 1993); Roberts v. Colorado State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824, 828-832 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1004 (1993); Gonyo v. Drake Univ., 879 F. Supp. 1000, 1003-06
(S.D. Iowa 1995).
16. 34 C.F.R. Part 106. The regulation was required to be submitted to Congress pursuant
to § 43 1(d)(1) of the General Education Provisions Act. For the significant provisions relating to
athletics, see supra note 10.
17. By the end of July, 1978, the OCR had received "nearly 100 complaints alleging
discrimination in athletics against more than 50 [i]nstitutions of higher education." 44 Fed. Reg.
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gender-based discrimination, the DED set forth the Policy Interpretation."8
The DED intended the Policy Interpretation to provide additional guidance
on what actions comply with Title IX. 19 One way the Policy Interpretation
provided guidance was through a three-prong test through which an
institution could demonstrate compliance with the dictates of Title IX. In
1996, the DED also created a Clarification of the Policy Interpretation to
resolve ambiguities in the three-prong test and to provide further guidance
on Title IX compliance.20
The Policy Interpretation three-prong test operates in the following
way: After a party has demonstrated that its injuries would constitute
gender discrimination, the burden of production shifts to the educational
institution.2 ' To fulfill its burden, the educational institution must satisfy at
least one prong of the three-prong test set forth by the Policy
Interpretation: substantial proportionality, historical expansion, or interest
accommodation.22
The first prong, substantial proportionality, requires an analysis of the
statistical proportionality of the institution's male and female athletic
participation in relation to the gender ratio of the institution's population
as a whole.23 If the ratio of male to female athletes is exactly proportional
to the ratio of male to female students, then an irrebuttable presumption
arises that the institution is in compliance with Title IX. 24 Additionally,

at 71,413. It is unclear whether these numbers include complaints prior to the enactment of Title
IX or were only during the 3-year transition period for Title IX's enactment.
18. Id.

19. See id. The reason that the OCR created the Policy Interpretation rather than amending
34 C.F.R. § 106 remains unclear, however, some of the implications of this decision are explored
infra Part III.C.
20. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RTs., U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., CLARIFICATION OF INTERCOLLEGIATE
ATHLETIC POLICY GUIDANCE: THE THREE-PART TEST (1996) (available at <http:/l

www.ed.gov/offices/OCR/clarific.html> (visited Dec. 18, 2000)) [hereinafter Clarification].
21. See also Cohen 11, 991 F.2d 888 (Plaintiff is required to "show disparity between the
gender composition of the institution's student body and its athletic program, thereby proving that

there is an underrepresented gender. Then, the plaintiff must show that a second element unmet interest - is present ....If the plaintiff carries the devoir of persuasion on these two
elements, she has proven her case unless the university shows, as an affirmative defense, 'a

history and continuing practice of program expansion which is demonstrably responsive to the
developing interests and abilities of the members' of the underrepresented gender."). Lipsett v.
University of P.R., 864 F.2d 881, 896 (1st Cir. 1988) (case law under Title VII applies to Title
IX claims); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05 (1973) (establishing
burden-shifting standard for Title VII disparate treatment discrimination cases). Cf Cohen v.
Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 901-02 (1st Cir. 1993).
22. Cf Clarification, supra note 20 ("If an institution has met any part of the three-part test,
OCR will determine that the institution is meeting this requirement."); Policy Interpretation, supra
note 11 at 71, 413-14.
23. See Policy Interpretation, supra note 11, at 71,418.
24. Cf Kelley v. Board ofTr., 35 F.3d 265,271 (7th Cir. 1994) ("[T]he policy interpretation

77TLE IXREGULATIONS

because an institution should not be expected to make minor adjustments
to its number of athletic opportunities based on insignificant changes in the
institution's overall population, if an institution is relatively close to the
ideal ratios, or "substantially proportionate," then the same presumption of
compliance arises.25 Neither the DED nor the courts, however, have
specifically defined what level of discrepancy would be considered
"substantially proportionate."26
The second prong, historical expansion, examines whether an institution
has a history of increasing opportunities for the traditionally disadvantaged
gender." Although the DED continues to assert that historical expansion
entails a distinct and separate examination from substantial proportionality,
such a position has been criticized by at least one commentator.28 That
commentator argues that although historical expansion requires a more
detailed examination of the institution than simply comparing the ratio of
athletic opportunities with the population of the educational institution, the
intended result is the same as substantial proportionality: substantial gender
proportionality between the athletic opportunities and population of the
institution.29
The third prong, interest accommodation, requires the institution to
demonstrate in a gender-neutral manner that it fully and effectively
accommodates the interests of the historically disadvantaged gender,
including students who are admitted, but not yet enrolled.3" An institution
can fulfill this prong by demonstrating that, despite disproportionately low
participation rates by the institution's historically disadvantaged gender, the
interests ofthe students are being fully and effectively accommodated. 3 In
1996, the Clarification set forth three criteria to make this determination:
whether there is unmet interest in a particular sport, whether there is
sufficient ability to sustain a team in a sport, and whether there is a

merely creates a presumption that a school is in compliance with Title IX and the applicable
regulation when it achieves such a statistical balance."); Clarification, supra note 20 (explaining
that if the ratio is exactly proportional, "then the institution would clearly satisfy part one.").
25. See Clarification, supra note 20.
26. Although undefined, the exact percentage of discrepancy can be inferred as something
less than 10%. See Roberts v. Colorado State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824, 830 (1Oth Cir. 1993)
(holding that a 10.5% disparity is "statistically significant" and does not clear the substantial
proportionality hurdle).
27. See Clarification, supra note 20.

28. See Patrick Shannon, Title IX and Other Sports Law Issues (1998) (unpublished paper,
University of Florida) (on file with author).
29. See id.

30. See Clarification, supranote 20.
31. See Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 898 (1st Cir. 1993) (Cohen If); see also
Clarification, supra note 20 (espousing the 1996 interpretation of the Policy Interpretation).
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reasonable expectation of competition for the team. 32 Following the 1996

Clarification, if all three conditions are present, then the institution has not
fully and effectively accommodated the interests and abilities of the
historically disadvantaged gender.33
B. The First Circuit: Cohen v. Brown University

Even though neither the Policy Interpretation nor the Clarification,
including the three-prong test, were ever amended into the regulations
promulgated under Title IX, courts have harnessed this test in order to
resolve issues of institutional compliance with Title IX. The first case to do
so was Cohen v. Brown University."
In Cohen, the appellant, a university, as a measure of fiscal
responsibility, eliminated four intercollegiate athletic sports: women's
volleyball and gymnastics and men's golf and water polo. 5 Although the
cuts did not substantially affect the athletic opportunity ratios at the
institution,36 following the cutbacks, appellees, members of the women's
volleyball and gymnastics teams sued under Title IX,37 charging that
appellant's athletic roster discriminated by gender.3 The district court
found for appellee and issued a preliminary injunction ordering appellant to
reinstate its women's volleyball and gymnastics programs.39 On appeal, the
First Circuit Court affirmed, invoking the Policy Interpretation's three-

32. See Clarification, supra note 20.
33. See id.

afft'd, 991 F.2d 888 (1st Cir.
34. 809 F. Supp. 978 (D.R.1. 1992) [hereinafter Cohen !],
ajfd inpart,
remanded 879 F. Supp. 185 (D.R.i. 1995) [hereinafter Cohen 111],
1993) [Cohen I1],
rev'd in part, 101 F.3d 155 (Ist Cir. 1996) [Cohen IV], cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1186 (1997).

[hereinafter collectively referred to as Cohen].
35. See Cohen II, 991 F.2d at 893.

36. Before the termination of the four teams, "Brown athletics offered an aggregate of 328
varsity slots for female athletics and 566 varsity slots for male athletics. Thus, women had 36.7%
of the athletic opportunities and men 63.3%. Abolishing the four varsity teams ... did not
materially affect the athletic opportunity ratios; women retained 36.6%... and men 63.4%." Id
at 892.
37. Although Title IX does not have an expressed private right of action, an implied private
right of action has been recognized under the statute. See Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch.,
503 U.S. 60, 65-66 (1992); Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 687 n.8, 717 (1979).
(holding that exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a prerequisite to a Title IX suit). For
a more detailed discussion of this issue see, Jarret Raab,Comment, Sexual Discrimination: Peer
Sexual Harassment and Its Effect Under Title IX, I I U. FLA. J.L. & PUB POL'Y 225 (2000)

(discussing the history of Title IX's implied private right of action).
38. See Cohen I[,
991 F.2d at 892-93.
39. See Cohen 1,809 F. Supp. at 1001.

TITLE IXREGULATIONS

prong test4" as an evidentiary standard governing the proof of a Title IX
violation."
The First Circuit Court began its analysis with Title IX.4 Finding the
statutory language too broad based to provide a helpful analysis, the court
turned to DED's regulatory framework interpreting Title IX.43 Unsatisfied
by the regulations, the court sought guidance from the Policy
Interpretation." Although the court found no record of the Policy
Interpretation's formal adoption, 45 the court ceded substantial deference to
the Policy Interpretation's three-prong test.' 6 The Cohen court ceded such
substantial deference that it began treating the Policy Interpretation as a
regulation.47
Under the court's analysis of the three-prong test, the first prong,
substantial proportionality, operates as a "safe harbor" provision.48
Essentially, by maintaining relatively equivalent gender proportionality
between the student body and athletic participation, an educational
institution could "stay on the sunny side" of Title IX. 49 The court viewed
the second prong, historical expansion, as allowing an institution to
demonstrate compliance by exhibiting a history of progression toward
40. See supranote 13.
41. See Cohen 11, 991 F.2d at 896-900.
42. See id at 893-95.
43. See id. at 895. Additionally, the Court referred to 34 C.F.R. Part 106. For a discussion
ofthese regulations see supranote 10. See also Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def.Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984)(holding that an agency's own regulations must be accorded
appreciable deference).
44. See supra note 13.
45. After an exhaustive search, the author could also find no record of agency adoption.
46. At least part of the reason the court turned to this framework without discussion was due
to the parties' arguments, or lack thereof. See Cohen 11, 991 F.2d at 896-97 ("Although we can
find no record that DED formally adopted the Policy Interpretation, we see no point to splitting
the hair, particularlywhere the partieshave not asked us to do so. Because this document is a
considered interpretation of the regulation, we cede it substantialdeference.") (emphasis added).
47. See infra note 64.
48. See Cohen 11, 991 F.2d at 897.
49. See id. at 898. Commentators have argued that the Cohen interpretation of "substantial
proportionality" institutes a "numerical quota" on athletic participation. See Shannon, supra note
28; Donald C. Mahoney, Note and Comment, A CriticalReview ofJudicialand Administrative
Interpretationsof Title IXas Appliedto IntercollegiateAthletic Programs,27 CONN. L. REV. 943
(1995) (examining legislative history and application of Title IX and determining that present
judicial interpretation of Policy Interpretation creates a quota scheme contravening the intent of
Congress). The First Circuit opposed this view in Cohen 11, 991 F.2d at 900-01, and the OCR
continues to oppose this view today. See Cover Letter to Clarification, supra note 14.
In Cohen, the First Circuit eventually affirmed the district court's finding. See Cohen II, 991
F.2d at 892. Although the teams' elimination did not materially affect the comparative ratio of
athletes (from 36.7% women and 63.3% men to 36.6% women and 63.4% men), the First Circuit
determined that either ratio was not "substantially proportionate" to appellant's student body
gender ratio (approximately 52% men and 48%/c women). See id
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substantial proportionality." With respect to the final prong, the court
found that interest accommodation requires "full and effective
accommodation" of the statistically underrepresented gender.5 If existing
programs do not completely fulfill the underrepresented gender's interests
with opportunities
to compete, the institution necessarily fails the third
52
prong.
The court rejected appellant's argument that the Policy Interpretation
exceeds its enabling legislation.53 The error in appellant's reasoning, the
court determined, was that appellant ignored the term "full" in its duty to
"fully and effectively" accommodate. 4 Contributing to this conclusion, the
court determined that the "essence" of the Policy Interpretation originates
in Title IX. 55 Furthermore, because the court determined that the Policy

50. See id. at 898. Although the Cohen court implies that these prongs are independent, an
analysis of this determination demonstrates that it anchors on a unstable seabed. If an institution
has a history of expanding opportunities for an underrepresented gender, yet does not satisfy the
first-prong, there is no other goal to this expansion than reaching "substantial proportionality."
The First Circuit itself stated that the purpose behind historical expansion is that "Title IX does
not require that the university leap to complete gender parity in a single bound." Id. at 898. In
Cohen, although the court never directly explored whether appellant had made a showing of
historical expansion, the court's affirmation of the district court strongly implies that appellant
never did. The third prong of the test suffers from a similar problem. See infra note 52.
51. Cohen II, 991 F.2d ai 898.
52. The independence of this prong is also tenable, despite the protests of the DED. See
Cover Letter to Clarification, supra note 14. Under the First Circuit's analysis, although the
institution must fully accommodate the interests of the underrepresented gender, satisfying "full
and effective" accommodation in the course of litigation is all but impossible. If a party is
contesting the issue, it is because they have an unmet interest in intercollegiate athletics.
Therefore, any time a party reaches this prong of the test, it will fail, forcing the institution to
compliance with the first prong. In fact, no court analyzing this issue has found that an institution
that has satisfied interest accommodation when they have not satisfied "substantial
proportionality." See, e.g., Pederson v. Louisiana State Univ., 201 F.3d 388, 408-10 (5th Cir.
2000); Neal v. Board of Tr., 198 F.3d 763, 768-69 (9th Cir. 1999); Kelley v. Board of Tr., 35 F.3d
265, 269-72, (7th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1128 (1995); Cohen II, 991 F.2d at 897-98;
Roberts v. Colorado State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824, 829-30, 832 (10th Cir. 1993).
Although appellant offered evidence that it had met some of the interest exhibited by the
underrepresented gender, impliedly appellant's accommodation was not full. See Cohen II, 991
F.2d at 898. If so, it is unlikely that an aggrieved party would have ever contested the issue.
53. See id. at 899-900.
54. See id. at 899. The First Circuit did not attribute its quotation of the words "fully and
effectively." The First Circuit's failure to attribute becomes problematic since the words "fully
and effectively" do not appear in Title IX or the DED regulations. See supra notes 2, 4-6, & 13.
The phrase "fully and effectively" first appears in the Policy Interpretation. See Policy
Interpretation, supranote I I at 71,418. For a discussion of the tautology resulting from the First
Circuit's unattributed quotation see text accompanying infra notes 94-95.
55. Cohen I, 991 F.2d at 899.

2001
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Interpretation is a "plausible, if not inevitable," reading of the statute,5 6the
court found that it was obligated to enforce the Policy Interpretation.
C. The Seventh Circuit: Kelley v. Board of Trustees
of the University of Illinois
Most circuit courts of appeal hearing Title IX issues adopted Cohen's
view of the significance of the Policy Interpretation without question." It
was not until Kelley v. Boardof Trustees of the University offllinois58 that
another circuit did anything more than blindly accept Cohen and integrate
the case into its reasoning. Although Kelley took the less traveled path of
reexamining how the Policy Interpretation applies to Title IX and its
regulatory framework, it stopped short of directly questioning whether the
Policy Interpretation properly interprets Title IX's regulations.
In Kelley, appellants, members of a men's swimming program, brought
a civil rights action against appellees, trustees of a state university, alleging
that appellees' actions of terminating four varsity teams, including men's
swimming, violated Title IX 9 by discriminating against male athletes."0
After hearing testimony supporting appellants' request for a preliminary
injunction and receiving affidavits supporting appellees' motion for
summary judgment, the district court granted summary judgment in favor
of appellees and found that the request for a preliminary injunction was
therefore moot. 6' Affirming, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeal held that
appellees' decision to eliminate the men's swimming program while sparing
the women's swimming program did not violate Title IX.62
In making its determination, the Kelley court turned to the three-prong
test set forth by the Policy Interpretation.63 The Kelley court began with the
proposition that the Title IX regulations must be accorded considerable
deference." After determining that the DED's regulations were not

56. Id. To set forth this proposition, the First Circuit improperly relied on Chevron, 467 U.S.
837. See infra notes 64 & 67.
57. See Favia v. Indiana Univ. of Pa., 7 F.3d 332 (3rd Cir. 1993); Roberts, 998 F.2d 824.
58. 35 F.3d 265 (7th Cir. 1994).
59. Appellants also alleged appellee violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. See Kelley v. Board of Tr., 35 F.3d 265, 267 (7th Cir. 1994). However, the court's
holding on the Equal Protection Clause issue goes beyond the scope of this note.
60. Id. at 267-69.
61. See Kelley v. Board of Tr., 832 F. Supp. 237 (C.D. 11. 1993).
62. See Kelley, 35 F.3d at 271-72.

63. See idl at 268.
64. See id. at 270. The Kelley court relied on Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984), which held that where Congress has expressly delegated
to an agency the power to "elucidate a specific provision of the statue by regulation," the resulting
regulations should be given "controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly
contrary to the statute." See Kelley, 35 F.3d at 270. However, unlike Cohen, Kelley properly
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contrary to Title IX or arbitrary in form, the Kelley court turned to the
Policy Interpretation.65 The Kelley court determined that the Policy
Interpretation is a reasonable interpretation of the DED's regulations. 66
Accordingly, the court found that it was required to defer to the Policy
Interpretation, 6' and concluded that the Policy Interpretation provides a
presumption ofwhen "effective accommodation" has been achieved. 6 The
court then adopted the three-prong test. 69 Despite its somewhat
distinguishable analysis, the Kelley court did not address whether the threeprong test was a proper subject matter for a DED interpretation, such as
the Policy Interpretation. The Kelley court also did not address whether the
Policy Interpretation was indeed an interpretation or a defacto regulation."0
D. The Sixth Circuit: Homer v. Kentucky High
School Athletic Association
The Kelley court's examination of the Policy Interpretation, however
brief, may have been one of the last times that a court examined the
appropriateness of applying the DED's interpretation of its own regulations
as a controlling authority in Title IX cases. Soon after Kelley, the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals in Horner v. Kentucky High SchoolAthleticAss. "
indicated that future examinations ofthe Policy Interpretation should yield
to Cohen for guidance, rather than relying on Kelley or independent logic.'
The Homer appellants, female high school student athletes, sued

applied Chevron to a regulation. See supranote 56 and infra note 66-67 and accompanying text.
65. See Kelley, 35 F.3d at 270-71.
66. See id. at 271.
67. See id.
See also Martin v. Occupational Safety& Health Review Comm'n, 499 U.S. 144,
150 (1991 )(explaining that a court must defer to an agency's interpretation of its regulations ifthat
interpretation is reasonable).
68. See Kelley, 35 F.3d at 268. Under Title IX, in determining whether equal opportunities
exist in an athletic program, one factor to be considered is "[w]hether the selection of sports and
levels of competition effectively accommodatethe interests and abilities of members of both sexes.
See 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c)(1) (2000) (emphasis added).
69. See Kelley, 35 F.3d at 271.
70. The liability for the absence of such a determination cannot be solely posited with the
court. The court's characterization of appellants' argument implies that if the regulation was
controlling, then the Policy Interpretation was controlling. See Kelley, 35 F.3d at 270 ("Plaintiffs
contend... that the applicable regulation... and policy interpretation... pervert Title IX.")
(emphasis added). Furthermore, appellants' other argument took issue with what they believed
to be a quota system resulting from the "substantial proportionality" test. See id at 271 ("Plaintiffs
...argue that the substantial proportionality test contained in the agency's policy interpretation
of that regulation establishes a gender based quota system, a scheme they allege is contrary to the
mandates of Title IX."). The reason for the gap in the Kelley court's logic could therefore be
attributable to the appellants' argument. In the alternative, see discussion infra Part IV.A.
71. 43 F.3d 265 (6th Cir. 1994).
72. See id at 275.
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appellees, the local school board and high school athletic association, under
Title IX" alleging gender discrimination in allowing fewer sports teams for
girls than boys, thus affording unequal athletic opportunity. 74 The district
court granted summary judgment for appellees, finding appellees'
justification to be gender-neutral and to adequately reflect a lack of enough
student interest tojustify more teams.7" The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the issue of whether
appellees effectively accommodated female athletes' interests presented a
genuine issue of material fact for the district court.76
In order to determine whether an institution has met its effective
accommodation obligations, the Homer court determined that "reference
must be made" to the Policy Interpretation.' Adopting both Cohen's logic
and lexicon, the Homer court found that the Policy Interpretation was
entitled to "substantial deference," "dr[ew] its essence from" Title IX, and
"st[ood] upon a 'plausible, if not inevitable reading of Title IX."''
Although it relied on Cohen, the Homer court differed in that it recognized
that the Policy Interpretation is an interpretation of a DED regulation, and
not a regulation itself.79 However, the Sixth Circuit's observation may have
been in vain because by relying so strongly upon Cohen in its reasoning, the
Hornercourt effectively imputed Cohen'sreasoning into its own decision."0

73. Appellants also sued under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
and state law. See Homer, 43 F.3d at 270.
74. See id
75. See id Summary judgment was only granted on the Equal Protection Clause and Title
IX claims. See id. at 270-71.
76. See id at 275. Judge Batchelder disagreed, pointing out that the "burden of proving
statistical disparity and unmet interest squarely [rests] on the shoulders of the plaintiffs." Id at
277 (Batchelder, J.,
dissenting).
77. Id.
at 273. Although initially principally intended as guidance for intercollegiate athletic
programs the "general principles will often apply to.. . interscholastic athletic programs which
are also covered by [the] regulation." Policy Interpretation, supra note 1i,at 71, 413. At least one
case prior to Homer had so applied the Policy Interpretation. See Williams v. School Dist., 998
F.2d 168, 171 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1043 (1994).
78. Homer, 43 F.3d at 273, 274-75 (quoting Cohen v. Brown Univ. (Cohen I1), 991 F.2d
888, 899 (1st Cir. 1993)). See infra note 127.
79. Compare Homer, 43 F.3d at 273 ("The Policy Interpretation is a 'considered
interpretation' of the applicable regulations ....
")with Cohen II, 991 F.2d at 899 ("[W]e are
obligated to enforce the regulation[referring to the Policy Interpretation] according to its tenor.")
(emphasis added).
80. This raises a question whether imputing the reasoning of another court carries the
baggage of the original opinion with it. This question remains unanswered in the context of Title
IX.
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III. ATTENUATING INTENT
A. The Policy Interpretation'sPlace in the Puzzle
Categorizing the Policy Interpretation requires an examination of Title
IX and the legislative and DED enactments both preceding and proceeding
it. Most clearly, Title IX functions as an enabling act for the DED to
promulgate regulations to inhibit gender-based discrimination in educational
institutions."' Acting pursuant to the enabling capabilities of Title IX, the
DED codified regulations aimed at curbing gender-based discrimination in
many areas, including the realm of athletics.?2 The Policy Interpretation was
created to explain the OCR's "approach to determining compliance" with
the DED regulations.8 3 Despite its purpose, the Policy Interpretation is not
a regulation."
Whether viewed as an interpretive rule or a general statement of policy,
the DED was not required to circulate the Policy Interpretation for public
comment or to make it publicly available prior to its use. 5 That these steps
are unnecessary becomes especially unsettling when it becomes clear that
portions of the Policy Interpretation are less interpretive and more
regulatory in nature.
For example, one of Title IX's regulations, 34 C.F.R. § 106.41, sets
forth a non-exclusive list often factors to be considered when determining
whether equal opportunity is available in an athletic program. 6 Harnessing
the non-exclusive nature of the regulation, in the Policy Interpretation, the
DED added two factors to this list: recruitment of student athletes and
provision of support services.8 7 However, the added factors are tenuously,
if at all, related to the original factors in the regulation. 8 Indeed, one would
81. See supra note 5.
82. See supra note 10.
83. Policy Interpretation, supra note 11, at 71,413.
84. Although one might point out that the Policy Interpretation was enacted pursuant to the
APA requirement for notice and comment rulemaking, this misses the point. See 5 U.S.C. § 553.
One of the objectives of rulemaking is to provide adequate notice to parties of policy changes and
the Policy Interpretation may have set forth such notice, however it created a situation where later
enactments do not. See Clarification, supra note 20.
85. Although the DED took these steps with the Policy Interpretation, expressions of agency
intent create no obligation to do so. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(3)(A) (1999).
86. See supra note 10 (34 C.F.R § 106.41(c) outlines the ten factors).
87. See Policy Interpretation, supra note 11, at 71,415.
88. With the exception of "[w]hether the selection of sports and levels of competition
effectively accommodate the interests and abilities of members of both sexes" the factors in the
regulation set forth narrowly drawn factors for the DED to consider. See supra note 10. The factors
"recruitment of student athletes" and "provision of support services" are painted with a broader
stroke, leaving much of their interpretation to be carved with the individual inclinations of an
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question why the DED, which was responsible for promulgating the
original regulation, would set forth an amendment in its Policy
Interpretation rather than amending the regulation.89 Furthermore, since the
DED has taken the steps of notice and comment in the past, it may be
required to do so with the Clarification and any future revision ofthe Policy
Interpretation.90
While the DED's arbitrary addition of factors to 34 C.F.R. § 106.41 is
unsettling, the DED's construction of the three-prong test for Title IX
compliance is disconcerting. Within an interpretation of a regulation, the
DED sets forth a test to determine whether a person has been "subjected
. . . to discrimination under [an] education program or activity."'
Effectively, to determine an educational institution's compliance with Title
IX, the DED turns, not to a promulgated regulation, but to a document two
steps removed from Title IX.92 Furthermore, any educational institution
receiving federal assistance is obligated to keep abreast of any changes or
clarifications to the Policy Interpretation, forcing educational institutions
to abide by interpretations of interpretations four to five times removed
from the original statute which may or may not be published in the Federal
Register and offer the opportunity for public comment before their
promulgation.93

inspector.
89. See discussion infra Part III C. The DED's original rationale could be any of a number
of possibilities including a desire to be able to avoid future notice and comment procedures to
simple oversight to a hope that later hostile administrations would believe that the policy
interpretation was not easily amended or revoked.
90. See Abbs v. Sullivan, 756 F. Supp. 1172, 1188 (W.D. Wis. 1990) (finding that "[a]s a
result of this voluntary election by the Secretary to abide by the rulemaking provisions of the
[APA], courts have held [HHS] to strict compliance with the notice and comment requirements
when promulgating regulations."), vacated, 963 F.2d 918 (7th Cir. 1992); see also Gardner v.
FCC, 530 F.2d 1086, 1090 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (holding that "[o]nce having stated that it will give
such notice, the [FCC] has created a reasonable expectation in the parties to the proceeding that
such notice will be received.").
91. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1999).
92.. See discussion supra Part II.A. If Title IX is the enabling act and the regulations used
to enforce Title IX, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 etseq., are one step removed, then the Policy Interpretation
of those regulations are two steps removed from the original statute. Furthermore, under the same
logic, the Clarification of the Policy Interpretation of the regulations of Title IX are three steps
removed from any Congressional authorization.
93. Although presently there is only one Clarification of the Policy Interpretation the
Clarification was adopted by the DED without a notice and comment procedure. See Clarification,
supranote 20. There is no legislative bar from a future administration setting forth Clarfications
of the Clarification, or Clarifications of the Clarification of the Clarification, further attenuating
the DED's actions from the original intent of Congress. But see supra note 90. Additionally, no
matter how far removed any future interpretations may be, they still command "substantial
deference" from the judiciary. See Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 499
U.S. 144, 150 (1991) (explaining that a court must defer to an agency's interpretation of its
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B. Judicial Classificationof the PolicyInterpretation
Judicial categorizations of the Policy Interpretation within Title IX's
statutory and regulatory scheme have been ambiguous at best. Although the
Cohen court clearly outlined the history of the Policy Interpretation,
including its failure to be formally promulgated, it conferred regulatory
status upon the Policy Interpretation and the three-prong test.94 However,
in doing so, the Cohen court set forth a tautology. To reject appellant's
argument that the DED was acting outside of its authority when it
promulgated the Policy Interpretation, rather than reference the enabling
legislation or the regulatory framework, the court turned to the Policy
Interpretation itself.95 Effectively, the Cohen court held that the Policy
Interpretation falls within the enabling legislation because the Policy
Interpretation says it does.
The Kelley court was somewhat more logical in its approach. In Kelley,
the court began by recognizing that the Policy Interpretation was an
extrapolation of the DED regulation, which in turn was an extrapolation of
Title IX." However, the Kelley court stopped short of delving into whether
the nature of the three-prong test commands that it be placed within a
properly promulgated DED regulation rather than the Policy Interpretation.
C. The Dangersof Giving InterpretationsRegulatory Power
Attenuating the interpretation of a statute so far from the actual statute
raises a number of problems. One problem is that turning to an
interpretation subverts the need to amend regulations.97 By using

regulations if that interpretation is reasonable).
94. See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
95. See Cohen v. Brown Univ. (Cohen 1/), 991 F.2d 888, 899 (1st Cir. 1993) ("Brown
argues that DED's Policy Interpretation, construed as we have just outlined, goes so far afield that
it countervails the enabling legislation... Brown reads the 'full' out of the duty to accommodate
'fully and effectively."'); see also 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (1999). (making no mention of "fully
and effectively"); 34 C.F.R. §§ 106.37, .41 (2000) (same), cf Policy Interpretation, supranote 11,
at 71,418 ("Where the members of one sex are underrepresented among intercollegiate athletes,
and the institution cannot show a continuing practice of program expansion such as that cited
above, whether it can be demonstrated that the interest and abilities of the members of the sex
have been fully and effectively accommodated by the present program.") (emphasis added).
96. See Kelley v. Board of Tr., 35 F.3d 265, 270-71 (7th Cir. 1994).
97. See Martin,499 U.S. at 151 (concluding that'"b]ecause applying an agency's regulation
to complex or changing circumstances calls upon the agency's unique expertise and policymaking
prerogatives, we presume that the power authoritatively to interpret its own regulation is a
component of the agency's delegated lawmaking powers."). But see National Family Planning &
Reprod. Health Ass'n, Inc. v. Sullivan, 979 F.2d 227, 240 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (holding that an
agency could not "amend" a rule through interpretation); Pettibone Corp. v. United States, 34 F.3d
536, 541-42 (7th Cir. 1994) (rejecting the IRS's claim that it could update an outdated regulation
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interpretations as controlling authority, an agency may change regulations
without following amendment procedures.9" Furthermore, an agency's
interpretation may change over time, causing the initial intent of the
regulation to fall to the wayside in favor of a more subjective
interpretation."
Additionally, accepting interpretations as controlling authorities could
lead agencies to avoid promulgating regulations any more than necessary.
As an agency prepares for changes in the social and political culture, the
agency may decide to react with broad regulations modified by more
specific, informal methods than to have its options restricted by specific,
pre-determined regulations." ° Courts' strong deference to agency
interpretations discourages agencies from promulgating specific regulations
that set forth clear principles in favor ofvague regulations supplemented by
malleable interpretations.'' Indeed, in the case of the DED, rather than

by reinterpreting it).
98. See supra text accompanying notes 23 & 86-88 (addition of three-prong test and
"recruitment of student athletes" and "provision of support services" factors); see also Paralyzed
Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena L.P., 117 F.3d 579, 586 (D.C. Cir. 1997XUnder Chevron "there
is no barrier to an agency altering its initial interpretation to adopt another reasonable
interpretation - even one that represents a new policy response generated by a different
administration."); Merrick B. Garland, Deregulationand JudicialReview, 98 HARV. L. REV. 505,
585-86 (1985) (same).
99. See Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 857-58 (1984).
A purely theoretical understanding of this conflict would lead to the conclusion that this would
be impossible, as the theory behind this principle rests upon the premise that an "agency typically
is in a superior position to determine what it intended when it issued a rule, how and when it
intended the rule to apply, and the interpretation of the rule that makes the most sense given the
agency's purposes in issuing the rule." I KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR.,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 6.10, at 282 (3d ed. 1994).
100. See Paralyzed Veterans, 117 F.3d at 584 (concluding that, "A substantive regulation
must have sufficient content and definitiveness as to be a meaningful exercise of agency
lawmaking. It is certainly not open to an agency to promulgate mush and then give it concrete form
only though subsequent less formal 'interpretations."'). Cf. Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala,
512 U.S. 504, 525 (1994) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (explaining that "[i]t is perfectly
understandable, of course, for an agency to issue vague regulations, because to do so maximizes
agency power and allows the agency greater latitude to make law through adjudication rather than
through the more cumbersome rulemaking process").
101. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844 (holding that an agency's regulations must be accorded
appreciable deference); Martin,499 U.S. at 150 (finding that a court must defer to an agency's
interpretation of its regulations if that interpretation is reasonable); see also Lars Noah, Divining
Regulatory Intent: The Placefor a "LegislativeHistory" ofAgency Rules, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 257,
290, 294 (2000) (noting that judicial deference "creates incentives for agencies to promulgate
excessively vague legislative rules that leave the more difficult task of specification to the more
flexible and unaccountable process of later 'interpreting' these open-ended regulations" as well
as noting that vesting such deference with an agency "may conflict with separation-of-powers
principles by lodging primary and largely conclusive interpretive power in the same entity that
exercises the lawmaking function."). See, e.g., Freeman Eng'g Assoc., Inc. v. FCC, 103 F.3d 169,
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amend the regulation or even the Policy Interpretation, the DED, in order
to alter policy priorities during the Clinton administration, adopted the
Clarification of the Policy Interpretation. °2 In the Clarification, the DED
delves more deeply into the Policy Interpretation's three-prong test,
reassessing the priorities
of enforcement for future conflicts with
03
educational institutions.1
Rather than depending on capricious agency interpretations, courts
should turn to more stable methods to determine the meaning of
ambiguities in regulations. One such method would be to turn to regulatory
preambles in order to fill in regulatory gaps.' Rather than the uncertainty
of informal processes, regulatory preambles offer the consistency when
determining the intent of the agency when it adopted a specific
regulation.0 5 The preamble of the Title IX regulation, 34 C.F.R. §
106.41,106 for example, demonstrates that its contemplated scope includes
both secondary schools and colleges,0 7 that regulation of athletics should
be codified through the regulatory process,"as and that institutions should
be required to consider the interests of both male and female students in
determining what sports to offer.1"9 A court adopting this method of

178 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Adams v. EPA, 38 F.3d 43, 49 (1st Cir. 1994).
102. See Clarification, supra note 20.
103. See id. But see Shalala v. Guernsey Mem'l Hosp., 514 U.S. 87, 110-11 (1995)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) (noting that "[a]n agency is bound by the regulations it promulgates and
may not attempt to circumvent the amendment process through substantive changes recorded in
an informal policy manual that are unsupported by the language of the regulation.").
104. See Noah, supra note 101, at Ill.C.4. (advocating the use of preambles to determine
administrative intent).
105. See id. at 304 n. 190 (explaining that "[e]ven if made available to most of the directly
interested parties, persons subject to (or benefitting from) the regulation will have no simple way
of determining whether they have before them the latest interpretation, in contrast to the greater
ease of checking the currency of a regulation appearing in the C.F.R and tracing its preamble.")
(parenthesis in original). See also Mullins Coal Co. v. Director, OWCP, 484 U.S. 135, 165 (1987)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (The preamble of a final rule is "strong evidence of regulatory intent.").
106. See NonDiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs and Activities
Receiving or Benefitting from Federal Financial Assistance, 40 Fed. Reg. 24,128 (1975)
[hereinafter NonDiscrimination Rule]. The preamble of 34 C.F.R. § 106.41 (2000) actually
appears with 45 C.F.R. § 86.41 (2000). As descendants of the Department of Health, Education
and Welfare, the Departments of Education and Health and Human Services have codified the
same regulations at separate locations in the United States Code. The Department of Health and
Human Services, however, has retained custody of the preamble.
107. See NonDiscrimination Rule, supra note 106, at 24,134 ("The Department continues to
take the position that athletics constitute an integral part of the educational processes of schools
and colleges and, as such, are fully subject to the requirement of title IX... ").
108. See id.("[T]he Department believes that coverage of athletics is mandated by [T]itle IX
and that'such coverage must be reflectedin the regulation.") (emphasis added).
109. See id. ("The Department's intent ... is to require institutions to take the interests of
both sexes into account in determining what sports to offer.").
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interpretation should encourage agencies that wish to change the manner
of implementation to take the sensible measure of amending the suitable
regulations, complete with their own amendment preambles, and providing
notice and comment procedures to interested parties.
IV. THE THREE-PRONG TEST REVISITED
A. Interpreting "SubstantialProportionality"
Such procedural concerns raise a number of substantive issues regarding
the DED's interpretation of Title IX. One such issue is the interpretation of
the phrase "substantial proportionality" in the first prong of three-prong test
espoused in the Policy Interpretation." 0 The predominant view of
"substantial proportionality" is that the term refers to athletic involvement
roughly relative to the proportion of the institution's gender ratio as a
whole. "' Title IX case law almost uniformly follows Cohen in interpreting
that "substantial proportionality" requires that the athletic gender ratio be
measured in relation to the institution-wide gender ratio." 2 In the
Clarification, published after Cohen,"3 the OCR adopted this interpretation
as its own." 4
However, this was not the first opportunity that the OCR took to
elaborate on the interpretation of "substantial proportionality." Internally,
the DED had previously interpreted the policy to mean that institutions
were required to meet the interests and abilities of men and women to the
same degree."' In doing so, the DED rejected the proportionality
interpretation espoused in the case law and the Clarification."' Subsequent
110. See Policy Interpretation, supra note II, at 71,418.
111. See supra notes 24 & 49 and text accompanying supra note 49.
112. See Neal v. Board of Tr., 198 F.3d 763, 767-68 (9th Cir. 1999); Cohen v. Brown Univ.
(Cohen IV), 101 F.3d 155, 172-73 (1st Cir. 1996); Homer v. Kentucky High Sch. Athletic Ass'n.,
43 F.3d 265, 275 (6th Cir. 1994); Cohen v. Brown Univ. (Cohen 11), 991 F.2d 888, 894 (1st Cir.

1993); Roberts v. Colorado State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824, 829-30 (10th Cir. 1993); Gonyo v.
Drake Univ., 879 F.Supp. 1000, 1004-05 (S.D. Iowa 1995).
113. The Clarification post-dated Cohen I, Cohen II, and Cohen 111, but not Cohen IV. See
Clarification, supra note 20.
114. See id. ("[W]here an institution provides intercollegiate level athletic participation
opportunities for male and female students in numbers substantially proportionate to their
respective full-time undergraduate enrollments, OCR will find that the institution is providing
nondiscriminatory participation opportunities for individuals of both sexes.").
115. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RTs., U.S. DEPT. OF EDUC, TITLE IX INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETIc
INVESTIGATOR'S MANUAL [hereinafter OCR MANUAL] 122 (1980) (Institutions are required to

"meet the interests and abilities of women to the same degree as they meet the interests and
abilities of men.") (emphasis added).
116. See id. at 122 (Institutions are "not requir[ed] .. , to offer, intercollegiate participation
opportunities" that are "proportional" to the gender ratio of the student body.).
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case law often reflected an unawareness of this prior interpretation or
dismissed it entirely." 7
The DED's initial proportionality interpretation directly conflicts with
the Cohen interpretation. Under the DED's initial interpretation, an
institution would comply with Title IX if the interests of men and women
were met to the same degree."' Effectively, an institution would be
considered in compliance if there was the same percentage of male and
female students who were unable to compete or, correspondingly, able to
compete." 9 Thus, under the initial DED interpretation, the determining
factor for "substantial proportionality" constituted an equal likelihood of
participation between male and female students.
The Cohen interpretation of "substantial proportionality" dismisses the
initial DED interpretation for a stricter approach. Rather than examining
whether the interests of men and woman are being proportionally met, the
Cohen approach began with the assumption that, absent a history of
discrimination, there would be exactly the same amount of interest in
athletics for both males and females. 2 ° Grounded on that foundation, the
Cohen approach reasons that the number of students interested in
competing is proportional to the gender ratio of the institution population
as a whole. Accordingly, if an institution has a gender athletic ratio
"substantially proportionate" to the overall gender population ratio, then an
irrebuttable presumption of compliance arises.'2 '
Unlike the initial DED interpretation, the Cohen interpretation sets forth
situations requiring preferential treatment. This is best illustrated by a
hypothetical.' 22 Assume that institution X has a perfectly even gender ratio
in the student body (50%/50%). Additionally, assume that there are 160
varsity positions to be allocated among 200 interested and able athletes.
Further assume that 120 of the athletes (60%) are men and 80 (40%) are
117. See, e.g., Pederson v. Louisiana State Univ., 201 F.3d 388,409-10 (5th Cir. 2000); Neal,
198 F.3d at 767; Homer, 43 F.3d at 273; Kelley v. Board of Tr., 35 F.3d 265, 268-72 (7th Cir.
1994); Favia v. Indiana Univ. of Pa., 7 F.3d 332,343-44 (3rd Cir. 1993). See also, e.g., Cohen IV,
101 F.3d at 179 n. 15 (considering a 1990 OCR MANUAL, then deciding on other grounds); Cohen
II,
991 F.2d at 896-97 & n.I I (same); Roberts, 998 F.2d at 828-29 & n.7 & 10 (same).
118. See supra note 115.
119. See supra notes 115 & 116.
120. See Cohen IV,101 F.3d at 179 (noting that "[i]nterest and ability rarely develop in a
vacuum; they evolve as a function of opportunity and experience.") (no support in original). The
author takes no position on whether this premise is faulty. Rather, the author seeks to point out
that the court has set forth no proof in either support or opposition of this premise.
121. See id. Although no court has explicitly defined the exact percentage that would
constitute "substantially proportionate," in Roberts, the Tenth Circuit found that a 10.5%
difference did not fit substantial proportionality, implying that it lies somewhere under 10%.
Roberts v. Colorado State Univ., 814 F. Supp. 1507 (D. Col.), af'd inpart, rev'd inpart,998
F.2d 824 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1004 (1993).
122. Shannon, supra note 28.
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women.' Under the initial DED interpretation, the likelihood of
participation is equal among both genders. However, under the Cohen
interpretation, these facts set forth a situation where a large number of male
athletes are turned away while a disproportionate percentage of female
athletes participate.
The Cohen interpretation does have benefits. Unlike the interest
assessment necessary with the initial DED interpretation, the Cohen
interpretation allows an institution to simply accumulate figures for its total
population and total athlete population and compare the two.'24 If the
percentage difference between the two exceeds the "substantially
proportionate" ratio, then the institution must either take an affirmative
action to return to the baseline or prove compliance with the second or
third prong of the test.'25
Although the Cohen interpretation sets forth an effortless system of
administration, sacrificing effectiveness for simplicity is not always proper.
Additionally, although the Policy Interpretation was initially intended for

123. Under these facts, the two interpretations set forth the following numbers:
Basis for
allocation

Gender

Athletes
Offered a
Varsity
Position

Athletes not
Offered a
Varsity
Position

Likelihood
to Play (%)

Student
Body Ratio
(Cohen)

Male

80

40

67%

Female

80

0

100%

Male

96

24

80%

Female

64

16

80%

Interest and
Ability
(initial
OCR)

Shannon, supranote 29.
124. See Cohen II, 991 F.2d at 897 (stating that "[tlhe first benchmark furnishes a safe harbor
for those institutions that have distributed athletic opportunities in numbers 'substantially
proportionate' to the gender composition of their student bodies").
125. See id.at 898 (stating that "[t]he second and third parts of the accommodation test
recognize that there are circumstances under which, as a practical matter, something short of this
proportionality is a satisfactory proxy for gender balance."). However, an institution is highly
unlikely to fulfill the second or third prong of the test. See supra note 50-52 and accompanying
text.
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intercollegiate athletic use, its precepts have been extended to other
scholastic athletic areas, including secondary education.'26 However, the
differing interpretations of "substantial proportionality" may both
effectively serve an educational
institution and its students ifthey are being
27
contexts.
different
in
used
B. Interest Analysis
Title IX's regulatory scheme clearly establishes that a determination of
equal opportunity requires an analysis of the interests and abilities of
members of both sexes. 28 What is less apparent is how that interest analysis
should be applied.
Under the Title IX's regulatory scheme, interest was a forefront
consideration. 2 9 Although some institutions initially believed that the
regulation required them to take an annual poll of the student body in order
to determine interest, the preamble relieved this concern. 3 The regulation's
preamble indicates that the original intent of the DED at the time of
promulgation was to consider interest.' 3 ' The regulation itself reflects the
original intent by listing interest accommodation first among the factors that
32
must be considered in determining the availability of equal opportunities.1
The Cohen interpretation, however, diminishes the importance of
interest analysis. Under Cohen, interest analysis is unnecessary unless an
institution has failed to demonstrate that its athletic program is not
"substantially proportionate" to the student body and does not have a
history and continuing practice of accommodating program expansion.' 33
126. See Homer v. Kentucky High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 43 F.3d 265, 271 (6th Cir. 1994);
Williams v. School Dist., 998 F.2d 168, 171 n.3 (3d Cir. 1993).
127. For example, a strict proportionality test may be better ina secondary education context,
where the principles of physical fitness are being inculcated into the child. However, an interest
based proportionality may be more appropriate in a collegiate environment, where the interests
of the individual are generally set and the institution is attempting to meet that interest. Such an
analysis is not without support in case law. Cf Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954)
(secondary education serves vital national interest of preparing youth for life in a democratic
Republic); Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 77 (1979) (secondary school inculcates youth with
"fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of" society); Board ofEduc. v. Pico, 457 U.S.
853, 864 (1982)(plurality opinion) (the secondary school educator nurtures students' social and
moral development by teaching them "community values").
128. See supra note 10 and infranote 132.
129. See NonDiscrimination Rule, supra note 106 at 24,134 ("The Department's intent...
is to require institutions to take the interest of both sexes into account in determining what sports
to offer.") (emphasis added).
130. See id.

131. See id.
132. See supra note 10 ("(1) Whether the selection of sports and levels of competition
effectively accommodate the interests and abilities of members of both sexes[.]").
133. See supra note 125.

TITLE IX REGULATIONS

Effectively, interest analysis becomes a fallback provision that is rarely, if
ever, considered. If it is considered, it almost never exculpates an institution
from wrongdoing. 34 By diminishing the importance of interest analysis,
Cohen dramatically deviates from the priorities implicitly established in the
regulatory framework and its preamble.
C. ProceduralImpact
The substantive concerns of Title IX cannot be considered in a vacuum.
Rather, the controversy surrounding such concerns requires an analysis of
their impact on the DED's procedures. Judicial interpretation has altered
the emphasis of both the substantial proportionality test and the interest
analysis test.' However, the Cohen court made such alterations while
purporting to yield "substantial deference" to the DED's interpretation of
its own regulations. 3 6 In a sense, the preeminent interpretation of Title IX
extends deference to agency interpretation with one hand, but relinquishes
any utility of that deference with the other.
Conversely, the Cohen court's resolution, although bewildering, may
not have been without merit. If the Policy Interpretation goes beyond
advising the public of the agency's construction of Title IX and provides
the DED with a Title IX enforcement mechanism, then the Policy
Interpretation should be a substantive rule, not an interpretive rule.' 37
However, the Cohen court did not consider the Policy Interpretation a
substantive rule because in determining the authority of the Policy
Interpretation the Cohen court applied a "substantial deference" standard,
the standard reserved only for an interpretive rule.' Despite the DED's
labeling of the Policy Interpretation as an interpretive rule, had the Cohen
court determinated that the Policy Interpretation was a substantive rule
once the court determined that the Policy Interpretation was a reasonable
construction of Title IX, the court would have determined it to be
controllingending its analysis.' 39

134. See supra note 52.
135. See discussion supra Parts IV. A.-B.
136. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
137. See American Mining Cong. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106, 1109
(D.C. Cir. 1993) (quoting Attorney General'sManualon the AdministrativeProcedureAct, at 30
n.3 (1947)). There are also indications that DED deviated from Congress' intent not to institute
a quota scheme to establish gender equality. See Mahoney, supra note 49. A thorough examination
of this issue raises the question of an agency's responsibility to defer to legislative history in
promulgating regulations. That question lies beyond the bounds of this Note.
138. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
139. See supra note 64.
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V. CONCLUSION

Title IX is often recognized as the most important legislative tool to
provide women with athletic opportunity. However, if the foundation upon
which that policy is laid falters, the substantive goals of Title IX will
crumble with it. The DED's present method to achieve gender equality
turns administrative law on its head. Rather than attain Title IX's goals
through properly enacted regulations, the DED has taken the path of least
resistance: Public policy through internal agency interpretations and policy
statements.
The principle of judicial deference to administrative internal
interpretations is not devoid of logic. Agencies are often more
knowledgeable in their particular field than a federal judge would be.
However, in their efforts to provide deference to agency action, federal
courts have turned a blind eye to the unique circumstances of Title IX cases
and the distinguishable regulatory scheme surrounding them. Furthermore,
federal courts continue to pass on stable methods of interpretation, such as
statutory and regulatory preambles, settling for the often fluctuating
political interpretations of agencies, such as the DED. Courts should return
to consistent methods of Title IX interpretation, relying on logic, not
beginning and ending an inquiry with an internal agency determination or
a sister circuits' prior interpretation.
As courts continue to strive for gender equality in athletics, they should
consider a different path. Courts should not only consider Title IX's
substantive policies and concerns, but also should insure the procedural
stability of Title IX in order to provide equality for all of America's
students.

